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Abstract 
The main topic of this contribution is how privacy rights 
influence the exercise of freedom of expression. The 
contribution has three components. The first part of this 
contribution discusses the development of privacy rights from 
‘the right to be left alone’ to the ‘the right to decide what 
information is shared’. This changing conception is related to 
freedom of expression rights. The author draws from Arendt, 
Foucault, and Mill to discuss this development. The second part 
consists of a short exposition of Dutch (constitutional and 
criminal) law. In this exposition, the author focusses on the 
constitutional freedom of expression and the criminal articles 
regulating publishers and pressers. In the third part, 
constitutional and criminal law developments for publishers and 
pressers are compared to the same laws for internet 
intermediaries. The author argues that for internet intermediaries 
the focus is not on safeguarding freedom of expression rights but 
on privacy rights. Under the influence of the internet and the 
privacy regulation from the European Union, the author shows 
that informational privacy rights have a negative impact on 
freedom of expression rights. The growth of privacy rights 
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manifests itself in an increasing responsibility for intermediaries 
to censor content, while the individual responsibility (both in 
moral and legal variety) to engage in the public debate decreases.  
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Introduction 
Freedom of expression and privacy are both fundamental rights, 
necessary to safeguard the democratic society. Like every other 
set of constitutional right, it is not possible to absolutise both 
freedom of expression rights and privacy rights concerning each 
other. For example, the European culture of freedom of 
expression is a culture of boundaries. 0F1 There are certain 
restrictions on the content freedom of expression. These 
restrictions may concern the content, the time, and the place of 
the expression.1F2  
Privacy is in many ways the new kid on the block. Ever since 
‘The Right to Privacy’ from Warren and Brandeis was published 
in 1890, 2F3 the academic publications concerning privacy rights 
have exploded. Therefore, it is no surprise that there are many 
conferences discussing privacy. In this respect, freedom of 
expression is a much less interesting subject. Most of us think to 
know what freedom of expression rights mean or should mean. 
Discussions about freedom of expression and modern 
communication technologies may raise new questions 
concerning the boundaries of this freedom. However, it does not 
seem necessary to discuss the underlying principles and the 
boundaries of this freedom. 
The rise of privacy laws does raise new questions about their 
relationship with freedom of expression laws. A recent example 
                                                 
1 While the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of 
America does not allow any state-induced restriction on the freedom of 
expression, the European culture is different. For example, article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights gives a lengthy list of restrictions 
on this freedom of expression. 
2 The full list of restrictions is to be found in article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
3 S.D. Warren & L.D. Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’, Harv. L. Rev. 1890, 
5, p. 193-220. 
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is the (possible) ‘disinformation’ campaigns from non-
democratic countries. Another problem is anonymous hate 
speech on social media. This and other internet criminality is 
hard to prosecute now the offenders are not always known. 
These problems share that the offenders are anonymous.  
This contribution is not intended as a critique of privacy laws but 
seeks to explore how ‘freedom of expression and privacy are 
balanced against each other. Are they, indeed, as the popular 
opinion holds, complementary rights?3F4 
The subject, research question and outline of this paper 
This conference paper should be considered as a first sketch of a 
thought. My primary research subject is freedom of expression 
and censorship online. I will explore the relationship between 
privacy right and freedom of expression and discuss how the rise 
of privacy rights can lead to new restrictions on freedom of 
expression.  
Some privacy rights are a direct restriction on the freedom of 
expression. It is, for entail example, not possible to publish 
anything about anyone. In this conference paper, however, the 
focus lies on a more indirect relationship between these rights. I 
will explore how privacy rights, the right to decide on what kind 
of information is shared (‘informational privacy’), may  
indirectly lead to restrictions on freedom of expression rights.  
To achieve this, I will first discuss ‘anonymity’ and ‘privacy’ as 
concepts. What does it mean to ‘have’ privacy? What does it 
mean to remain anonymous? How did these rights change over 
                                                 
4 See for example: M. Godwin, Cyber Rights: Defending Freedom of Speech 
in the Digital Age, Cambridge: MIT Press 2003, p. 16. 
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time? Next, to this conceptual sketch, I will argue how these 
concepts relate to each other and freedom of expression.  
In the second paragraph, I will give a brief history of the Dutch 
constitution and the struggle to balance privacy rights and 
‘freedom of expression’. Next to this more historical outline, I 
will focus on four articles from the Dutch penal code where this 
balance between privacy and freedom of expression is still 
reflected. 
In the third paragraph, I will elaborate on what I call ‘the privacy 
turn’, influenced by the European Union and modern 
communication technology. I will explore how (in contrast to the 
Dutch history) the balance between privacy and freedom of 
expression in European Union law is balanced in favour of 
privacy.  
I will finish this contribution with a short conclusion, mainly 
arguing that the relationship between privacy and freedom of 
expression rights should be rethought.  
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1 Privacy, anonymity, and their relationship to speech 
within the political 
As argued in the introduction of this paper, in this first 
paragraph, I will elaborate on ‘anonymity’ and ‘privacy’ as 
concepts. What does it mean to ‘have’ privacy? What does it 
mean to remain anonymous? How did these rights change over 
time? Moreover, how do these rights relate to freedom of 
expression? 
In the first subparagraph, I will sketch an outline of the concepts 
of both anonymity and privacy. In the second subparagraph, I 
will explore how speech relates to the political. In the third 
subparagraph, I discuss the privatisation of speech, meaning that 
speech was moved from the political, public domain, to the 
private domain. In short, I will explore how both privacy and 
freedom of expression relate to the public and the private 
domain.  
Drawing from Arendt, it becomes clear that freedom of 
expression and privacy do not stand on their own.4F5 These rights 
might have become rights for the autonomous individual, but 
that does not make them ‘autonomous’ rights, meaning that their 
application may be an exclusively private affair. This paragraph 
finishes with a short conclusion. I will shortly discuss what this 
changing conception means for the relationship between 
freedom of expression and privacy.  
                                                 
5 I do not deny that Arendt values privacy as an important right against 
totalitarianism. I merely question to what extent privacy within the public 
debate is possible. 
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Privacy as a state of being 
What does it mean to have privacy? The Oxford Dictionary 
provides us with two different definitions of privacy. The first 
definition is neutral and formal. Privacy is ‘[a] state in which one 
is not observed or disturbed by other people.’ 5F6 Such a definition 
does not seem to grasp what privacy means today. If someone 
shares information about me, I am not observed or disturbed 
directly, but my privacy is still ‘violated’. 
The second definition of privacy, ‘[t]he state of being free from 
public attention’,6F7 is even less helpful than the first one. Being 
free from public attention might be a minimum condition to 
speak of privacy. However, receiving public attention does not 
exclude the possibility to have privacy, now public attention can 
be given in many different ways. This definition, like the first 
one, views privacy as a binary state of being with only two 
possibilities: there is a condition where one is ‘alone’ and free 
from public attention (thus there is no disturbance and no 
observation) and a state where someone is together with other 
people and thus receives public attention (and is thus observed 
or disturbed). According to these definitions, in the first 
condition there is ‘privacy’, and in the second condition there is 
an ‘absence of privacy.’ Privacy is defined the same as seclusion, 
‘The state of being private and away from other people’.7F8  
Like privacy, The Oxford Dictionary gives different definitions 
for anonymity. The dictionary defines anonymity as ‘the 
                                                 
6 The Oxford Living Dictionaries English, ‘Privacy’, 
Oxforddictionaries.com (last retrieved on July 29, 2018). 
7 The Oxford Living Dictionaries English, ‘Privacy’, 
Oxforddictionaries.com (last retrieved on July 29, 2018). 
8 The Oxford Living Dictionaries English, ‘Seclusion’, 
Oxforddictionaries.com (last retrieved on July 29, 2018). 
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condition of being anonymous.’ Similar to the ‘status’-
definitions about privacy, this definition does not tell us much 
about anonymity. The second definition provides more 
information about anonymity. To be anonymous means to have 
a ‘[l]ack of outstanding, individual, or unusual features;’ it 
means ‘impersonality.’8F9  
However, these definitions of both privacy and anonymity do not 
differ much from the legal meaning of privacy. According to 
James Moor, privacy rights developed from non-intrusion to 
non-interference and later to informational privacy.9F10 Privacy 
rights are particularly relevant now a fabricated profile of 
individuals can provide a distorted image of his personality.10F11 
These different privacy rights are discussed later. I will now 
continue with privacy as ‘non-intrusion’.  
It is ‘non-intrusion’ what the German-American philosopher 
Hannah Arendt described when she wrote about privacy. 
According to Arendt, to be anonymous or private does not mean 
that a person is liberated. ‘In private life, one is hidden and can 
neither appear nor shine,’11F12 Arendt wrote. Privacy means exactly 
the opposite: it is the absence of personality (or at least the 
absence of sharing a personality). In a state where personality is 
kept private, it is impossible to engage in human relations as a 
‘human being.’ Arendt: ‘No human life, not even the life of the 
hermit in nature’s wilderness, is possible without a world which 
                                                 
9 The Oxford Living Dictionaries English, ‘Anonymity’, 
Oxforddictionaries.com (last retrieved on July 29, 2018). 
10 J.H. Moor, ‘Towards a theory of privacy in the information age’, ACM 
SIGCAS Computers and Society 1997, 3, p. 28. 
11 A. Ellian, ‘De laatste titel: ten persoonlijke titel. Over de wet als 
kunstwerk en privacy (Inleiding bij een tekst uit ‘De wet als kunstwerk’ van 
Willem Witteveen)’, P&I 2017, 4, p. 168. 
12 H. Arendt, The promise of politics, New York: Schocken Books 2007, p. 
14. 
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directly or indirectly testifies to the presence of other human 
beings.’12F13 For, Arendt, human life is non-existent without 
relationships with other humans.13F14  
Of course, this does not mean that Arendt argues for the 
abolishment of privacy and anonymity.14F15 Instead, Arendt draws 
from Ancient Greece where a sharp distinction between the 
political life and de private life existed.  
Before humans could enter the social life in Ancient Greece, 
some property was needed. For the Greeks, the possession of the 
private home, the oikos, constituted this property. This private 
home existed only for necessity: to labour to stay alive. Those 
who had enough property to be freed from this necessity of 
labour could enter the public realm; the realm where true 
humanity unfolds.15F16 According to Arendt, with the creation of 
the city-state as a political assembly, humans16F17 inhabiting this 
city-state gained a bios politikos, a political life.17F18 For Arendt, 
the lives of the private home, the oikos, and the political life, the 
bios politikos were distinct from each other. This distinction 
means that both the public and private realm had their specific 
function. Arendt follows Aristotle when she argues that both 
                                                 
13 H. Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press 1998, p. 22. 
14 H. Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press 1998, p. 23-24. 
15 See for example: H. Arendt, The promise of politics, New York: 
Schocken Books 2007, p. 25. 
16 E. Øverenget, ‘Heidegger and Arendt: Against the Imperialism of 
Privacy’, Philosophy Today 1995, 4, p. 432. 
17 For Aristoteles, only equals were seen as political humans (Politica 1325 
b 5 – 1325 b 10). 
18 H. Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press 1998, p. 24. 
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speech (lexis) and action (praxis) belongs to the public 
domain.18F19  
It is important to note that speech and action are exclusively 
human activities. For Arendt, humans do not exist in singularity. 
Humans only exist in their plurality with other humans. Humans 
are both equal (in their humanity) and distinct from each other. 19F20 
According to Seyla Benhabib, speech and action ‘[…] 
presupposes a fair degree of ethical and value homogeneity and 
convergence around a shared ethos.’20F21 This deliberative aspect 
of Athenian democracy is one of the primary characteristics of 
the polis. Arendt calls ‘the polis […] the most talkative of all 
bodies politic’.21F22 Not violence, but words constitute the 
political.22F23  
Freedom of speech and the political 
In the modern era, the oikos/polis distinction no longer holds up. 
Instead, the oikoi (the plural of oikos, households) are blend in 
what Arendt describes as ‘the facsimile of one super-human 
family what we call “society’.23F24 Where for the Greeks a certain 
amount of property, freeing the citizen from necessity, was 
required before entering the freedom of the political,24F25 in our 
                                                 
19 For Arendt, every activity has a certain task. Labor and work lie within 
the private sphere; praxis and lexis belong to the public sphere. The later 
constitutes freedom, see: E. Øverenget, ‘Heidegger and Arendt: Against the 
Imperialism of Privacy’, Philosophy Today 1995, 4, p. 432. 
20 H. Arendt, The promise of politics, New York: Schocken Books 2007, p. 
61-62. 
21 S. Benhabib, ‘The Embattled Public Sphere: Hannah Arendt, Juergen 
Habermas and Beyond’, Theoria 1997, 90, p. 5. 
22 H. Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press 1998, p. 26. 
23 H. Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press 1998, p. 25-27. 
24 H. Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press 1998, p. 29 
25 H. Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press 1998, p. 30-32. 
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time political freedoms are granted in advance by inherent 
human rights.25F26  
Such a human right to speak was alien to Ancient Greece. The 
right to speak had to be earned.26F27 For Arlene Saxonhouse the 
practice of this kind of speech is best grasped by calling it 
parrhesia. In Ancient Athena, parrhesia, ‘captured the full 
meaning of freedom. Not as a private possession enjoyed by the 
isolated individual, but as the embrace of a world where all could 
freely reveal themselves before others without the fear of 
suffering […]’.27F28  
Free speech, parrhesia, was not a right related to private 
autonomy but was connected to the polis as a political duty. 28F29 
Parrhesia is thus public speech, only exercisable within the 
presence of peers. For Saxonhouse, free speech in early Athena 
was not an instrument or a ‘safety valve’ against an external, 
possible tyrannical government, but an important principle of 
egalitarian, democratic, self-government.29F30  
Privacy and parrhesia are incompatible with each other. 
Speaking is closely related to the full humanity of the speaker. 
Parrhesia denies any privacy for the speaker. Speaking means 
exposing yourself. Parrhesia requires courage; it means risking 
one’s life by speaking. Michel Foucault defines parrhesia as 
‘telling the truth without concealment, reserve, empty manner of 
                                                 
26 Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
27 H. Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press 1998, p. 37, 
28 A.W. Saxonhouse, Free Speech and Democracy in Ancient Athens, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006, p. 208. 
29 A.W. Saxonhouse, Free Speech and Democracy in Ancient Athens, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006, p. 96. 
30 A.W. Saxonhouse, Free Speech and Democracy in Ancient Athens, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006, p. 28-30. 
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speech, or rhetorical ornament which might encode or hide it.’ 30F31 
Parrhesia does not allow concealment of truth, nor (partial) 
concealment of the identity of the speaker.  
For Foucault, the parrhesiast does not only speak. ‘[H]e binds 
himself to this truth, and he [is] consequently bound to it and by 
it’.31F32 Of course, not all kind of speech is parrhesia. Next to 
parrhesia Foucault distinguished three kinds of speaking. Most 
of the speakers speak from a certain ‘truth’ external from them. 
They speak not from their own convictions. The prophet speaks 
his prophecy, the teacher from his knowledge of how things 
work and the sage from his wisdom.32F33  
These forms of speaking have in common that the speaker 
himself is not in harm’s way and even might foster a productive 
relationship with others. Parrhesia is different from these forms 
of speech. For Foucault, the parrhesiast expresses a 
‘fundamental bond’ between thought and the spoken truth. 
Secondly, it challenges the relationship between the speaker and 
the person to whom the parrhesiast speaks. Parrhesia takes 
courage to endanger this relationship.33F34 This practice of speech 
does not mean shouting, ‘dropping’ opinions or plainly insult 
persons.34F35 The parrhesiast speaks from his deepest ethical 
convictions.35F36 
                                                 
31 M. Foucault, The Courage of Truth: The Government Of Self And Others 
II, New York: Picador 2012, p. 10. 
32 M. Foucault, The Courage of Truth: The Government Of Self And Others 
II, New York: Picador 2012, p. 10. 
33 M. Foucault, The Courage of Truth: The Government Of Self And Others 
II, New York: Picador 2012, p. 15-18 and 23-25. 
34 M. Foucault, The Courage of Truth: The Government Of Self And Others 
II, New York: Picador 2012, p. 11-12. 
35 M. Foucault, The Courage of Truth: The Government Of Self And Others 
II, New York: Picador 2012, p. 9.  
36 M. Foucault, The Courage of Truth: The Government Of Self And Others 
II, New York: Picador 2012, p. 25. 
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Privatization of speech in the modern age 
In the previous subparagraph, I covered an important restriction 
both on privacy and on freedom of speech. Both the practice of 
‘free speech’ as parrhesia and the necessary limitation on the 
privacy of the speaker is deeply linked with the deliberative ideal 
of democracy.36F37 Parrhesia thus is linked with the vital task of 
the public sphere to question existing agreements. To persuade 
others to change existing agreements, they need to provide good 
reasons, fitting within the mentality of others. 37F38 According to 
Arendt, truth does not persuade others, opinions do.38F39 
Privacy was important, but not in a public manner. Privacy was 
radical opposed to public life. As Arendt argues, privacy in 
Ancient Greece ‘meant literally a state of being deprived of 
something’.39F40 The modern belief is different from the ancient 
belief of privacy, provided by a new distinction between what is 
public and what is private. An often-heard argument is that free 
speech needs privacy. 40F41 The overwhelming public life requires 
the peace and quietness of the private home to think.41F42 Speech, 
however, is an activity of the public life: there is nothing private 
about speech as a human activity.  
                                                 
37 It is an interesting question whether this also is true for the other three 
kinds of speaking defined by Foucault. It is true that the prophet, the teacher 
and sage speak form a personal experience and skills. It is strange if these 
kinds of speakers could remain anonymous.  
38 S. Benhabib, ‘The Embattled Public Sphere: Hannah Arendt, Juergen 
Habermas and Beyond’, Theoria 1997, 90, p. 9-10 and 17. 
39 H. Arendt, The promise of politics, New York: Schocken Books 2007, p. 
25. 
40 H. Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press 1998, p. 38, 
41 T.G. Ash, Free Speech: Ten principles for a Connected World, London: 
Atlantic Books 2017, p. 285.  
42 H. Arendt, The promise of politics, New York: Schocken Books 2007, p. 
25. 
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Where in Ancient Greece these ‘domains’ were unambiguously 
distinct from each other, in the modern era this distinction 
between the public and the private became fluent. Now, politics 
set the boundary between what is public and what is private.42F43  
This renewed relationship with the public and the private space 
also changed our relationship with the political. Arendt: ‘While 
we have become excellent in the laboring we perform in public, 
our capacity for action and speech has lost much of its former 
quality since the rise of the social realm banished these into the 
sphere of the intimate and the private.’43F44 
The fading boundaries between public and private life are not the 
only meaningful development. The rise of modern 
communication technology makes it easier to share, gather, and 
use information. As Moor argued, ‘information about us can be 
collected subtlety when we do not realise it.’44F45 For Moor, the 
problem is that once information is gathered, it can be used for 
any purpose.45F46  
Accessing, sharing, and using privacy-sensitive information may 
create negative (or even harmful) consequences. The possibility 
that harmful information can be unknowingly shared shows the 
necessity to set boundaries for sharing information. This 
necessity means that there must be legal limits on what 
information can be accessed, shared, and used, when and by 
                                                 
43 H. Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press 1998, p. 45-46. 
44 H. Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press 1998, p. 49.  
45 J.H. Moor, ‘Towards a theory of privacy in the information age’, ACM 
SIGCAS Computers and Society 1997, 3, p. 27. 
46 J.H. Moor, ‘Towards a theory of privacy in the information age’, ACM 
SIGCAS Computers and Society 1997, 3, p. 28. 
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who, now that some content may be ‘harmful’ for individuals or 
even the state or society.  
The British philosopher John Stuart Mill paved the way for the 
transition from privacy as non-intrusion to privacy as non-
interference. For Mill preventing ‘harm’ means: ‘that the sole 
end for which mankind are warranted, individually or 
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of 
their number, is self-protection.’46F47 This conception of what is 
private leads to a much broader conception of privacy, extending 
its reach far within the public domain. Privacy entails for Mill a 
sphere of action. Not only conduct which affects the private 
person himself, but also conduct which affects others indirectly. 
Mill at least allows ‘liberty of thought and feeling; absolute 
freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or 
speculative, scientific, moral or theological’ but also; ‘without 
impediment from our fellow creatures, so long as what we do 
does not harm them, even though they should think our conduct 
foolish, perverse, or wrong.’ 47F48  
With Mill, the privatisation of the individual is complete. ‘In the 
part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of 
right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the 
individual is sovereign.’48F49 Mill wrote. For Mill, privacy is not 
merely an individual right; it is necessary for societal innovation 
and thus instrumental. Without privacy, there is no chance of 
                                                 
47 J.S. Mill, On Liberty, Utilitarianism and Other Essays, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2015, p. 13.  
48 J.S. Mill, On Liberty, Utilitarianism and Other Essays, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2015, p. 15. 
49 J.S. Mill, On Liberty, Utilitarianism and Other Essays, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2015, p. 13. 
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societal change. Privacy for Mill is both an individual right as a 
public necessity.49F50 
Proclaiming that individual actions, not harming others, are 
private, the classic distinction between the public and private 
sphere is no longer in place. Were for Arendt privacy is a 
temporary retreat to a private home, for Mill, it encompasses the 
individual action of speech within the public domain. Now 
speech does not ‘harm’ others, according to Mill; speech is ‘free’ 
as a private right within the public domain. Not the privacy-
distinction from Arendt as non-intrusion prevails, but the Millian 
non-interference became the dominant privacy conception. 
Recalling the three views on privacy (non-intrusion, non-
interference, and informational privacy) from Moor, 50F51 the last 
step that must be taken is the step to informational privacy.  
While Mill’s conception of privacy entailed a right to non-
intervention;there is not always intervention of the privacy on 
the internet. Most of the time there is only the gathering of 
information (‘surveillance’).51F52 A Millian conception of privacy 
only restricts data collection when it is harmful. European 
regulation only allows data processing (and thus collection) 
when one of the legitimate interests are fulfilled.52F53 Of course, 
this is not new. Already in 1890, Warren and Brandeis were 
mentioning privacy as the private decision to make something 
                                                 
50 J.S. Mill, On Liberty, Utilitarianism and Other Essays, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2015, p. 81-82. 
51 J.H. Moor, ‘Towards a theory of privacy in the information age’, ACM 
SIGCAS Computers and Society 1997, 3, p. 28. 
52 This gathering of information may be a governmental activity or a private 
(corporate) activity.  
53 Article 6 GDPR.  
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public: ‘The right to privacy ceases upon the publication of the 
facts by the individual, or with his consent’.53F54  
To conclude: privacy and freedom of expression 
In this paragraph, I discussed privacy (and anonymity) in 
relation to freedom of expression. Different from Ancient 
Greece, our modern conception of privacy is deeply linked with 
the personal decision to share. Privacy is no longer ‘withholding’ 
(as a negative) from the public, but a right (as a positive) to 
‘grand’ information. Those who are not granted access, are 
prohibited from bypassing this decision. When they do, privacy 
rights are violated.  
Privacy thus, changed from the opposition to what is public 
towards a private right in public. In Ancient Greece, the 
demarcation between public and private information was much 
clearer. While privacy was merely entering the private spaces, in 
the modern era privacy and the public domain became fluent.  
One of the problems related with this changing conception of 
privacy is that the right to ‘grant’ specific information has the 
consequence that information might be public by nature but can 
be withheld from this domain by private choice. In the following 
paragraphs will become clear that this is also a problem for the 
freedom of expression. 
  
                                                 
54 S.D. Warren & L.D. Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’, Harv. L. Rev. 
1890, 5, p. 218.  
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2 Public speech, private persons 
The Oxford dictionary defines publish as ‘[p]rint (something) in 
a book or journal to make it generally known.’ 54F55 An alternative 
definition is ‘[m]ake (content) available online.’ 55F56 According to 
the Oxford dictionary ‘to publish’ is derived from the Latin word 
publicare, meaning to ‘make public.’ 56F57 As this paragraph will 
point out, the act of publishing is determinative for entering the 
public realm with a written piece. It should be explained what 
precisely this act of publishing includes. 
For example, the draft of a paper may not be public. The author 
needs to fulfil an additional act, the act of publishing. After this 
act, a paper is made public. The author (or the author's 
institution) may decide where to publish a paper. This medium 
is also decisive for the audience of the paper. The author may 
ask a colleague, friend, or supervisor to read his paper and 
comment on it. Is this an act of publishing? Has the author by 
handing his paper to a specific readership decided that his paper 
should be public? Moreover, what if a paper is shared with 
students or distributed amongst conference participants? 
With the information and communication technology of today, 
this issue is more pressing. Such technology allows that specific 
information can be shared among a predefined group. Warren 
and Brandeis already argued in 1890 that the laws should 
establish what a publication (legally) is. 5 7F58 How large should a 
                                                 
55 The Oxford Living Dictionaries English, ‘Publish’, 
Oxforddictionaries.com (last retrieved on July 29, 2018). 
56 The Oxford Living Dictionaries English, ‘Publish’, 
Oxforddictionaries.com, (last retrieved on July 29, 2018). 
57 The Oxford Living Dictionaries English, ‘Publish’, 
Oxforddictionaries.com, (last retrieved on July 29, 2018). 
58 S.D. Warren & L.D. Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’, Harv. L. Rev. 
1890, 5, p. 218. 
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group be to speak of making something public? For Warren and 
Brandeis, private communication should not be regarded as a 
publication by a judge.58F59 There is no objective standard to decide 
if a message is public, now it depends on the specific context.59F60 
This question is increasingly relevant for anonymous publishing 
on the internet. How public is an anonymous publication now 
the author of this publication is not revealed to the world? 
In this paragraph, I will discuss how privacy as an individual 
right influences freedom of expression and censorship. Firstly, I 
will discuss how trust and privacy compare with each other. 
Secondly, I will shortly discuss the Dutch (constitutional) history 
(in particular De Staatsregeling voor het Bataafsche Volk) and 
its mechanism to prevent censorship and its relationship to 
censorship as a possible inspiration for contemporary 
discussions. Thirdly, I will discuss how this relationship between 
privacy and freedom of expression is implemented in our 
contemporary laws.  
Trust, privacy, and information sharing 
Is the possibility to publish online anonymously problematic? 
How does this relate to informational privacy: the right to decide 
on what information is shared? Moreover, how does this relate 
to the freedom of expression? Is there such a thing as a free 
speech in privacy? In the previous paragraph, I argued that this 
                                                 
59 S.D. Warren & L.D. Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’, Harv. L. Rev. 
1890, 5, p. 218. 
60 This question is especially relevant for internet publication, for example: 
The Court of Appeal Amsterdam judged that if a message, depending on the 
specific context of the case, is ‘published’ in small group and was retracted 
swiftly after publication, and therefore the potential reach of the message 
was limited, such a message is not ‘public’ in the sense that it makes the 
author liable for (harmful) allegations, see: Hof Amsterdam, February 23, 
2010, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2010:BL6050, ro. 4.7 and 4.9, Computerrecht 
2010, 75. 
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is not the case. Privacy and ‘free speech’ are incompatible with 
each other, now the essential characteristic of freedom of 
expression is its exercise in public. 
Mike Godwin argues that governments must trust societies with 
digital tools, even if they create the possibility to be 
anonymous.60F61 Should internet users be trusted with the 
possibility to publish in private: with the possibility to make 
something public while remaining private? 
Trust is vital for the internet. Informational privacy as a right 
depends on the lack of trust in users, companies, and 
governments to withhold themselves from gathering, sharing, 
and using information in a harmful way. Content may be 
(unwillingly) shared with a few persons, or the entire world.  
Similar, anonymity on the internet depends on the trust in users 
to use the internet wisely. Such trust is not always justified. An 
anonymous or ‘private’ internet does not necessarily require 
users to reveal their real identity. The internet consists of digital 
‘identities’, not always corresponding with offline 
personalities.61F62 Such freedoms were intended to create a 
democratic environment where speech is not only free, but also 
equal.62F63 According to Morozov, the free and anonymous internet 
is used by non-democratic users and networks. 63F64 With the recent 
controversy around ‘fake news’ by ‘internet trolls’ (may or may 
                                                 
61 M. Godwin, Cyber Rights: Defending Free Speech in the Digital Age, 
Cambridge: MIT Press 2004, p. 172-173. 
62 M. Godwin, Cyber Rights: Defending Free Speech in the Digital Age, 
Cambridge: MIT Press 2004, p. 359-360. 
63 For example: J.P. Barlow, ‘A Declaration of the Independence of 
Cyberspace’, eff.org (last retrieved on July 31, 2018) and J.P. Barlow, ‘To 
Be At Liberty’, eff.org (last retrieved on July 31, 2018). 
64 E. Morozov, The Net Delusion: How Not To Liberate The World, London: 
Penguin 2012, p. 256. 
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not originating) from other countries, this seems an 
understatement. 
The possibility for readers to judge if the information is 
trustworthy depends on the information shared next to the 
message. Without information about the speaker, it is impossible 
to judge if a statement is trustworthy. This lack of information 
causes that an anonymous voiced opinion should always be read 
with suspicion. Informational privacy as an individual choice to 
decide what private information should be made public widens 
the gap between author and reader. An indication exists, that 
citizens have little faith in information voiced by other citizens 
(in general) because specific background information (such as 
the educational background or occupation) often lacks, making 
the credibility of the speaker and information hard to check.64F65 
The Italian philosopher Cesare Beccaria already discusses this 
problem of information asymmetry between citizens in 1764. 
Beccaria makes a vital argument concerning privacy based on 
utilitarian arguments. Beccaria argued for a ‘public and open 
registration of all contracts, [and] the freedom for all citizens to 
inspect the systematically ordered documentation.’65F66 What is 
true for economics, is also true for public discourse. Information 
gives trust or at least a point of reflection to decide on the 
trustworthiness of the opinion.  
An interesting example of this discussion between privacy and 
the necessity to reveal personal information is the ‘real name 
policy’ from Facebook, originating from 2014. Targeting 
                                                 
65 P. Dekker, L. van der Ham &A. Wennekers, Burgerperspectieven 2018|1, 
Den Haag: SCP 2018, p. 45. 
66 C. Beccaria, ‘On Crimes and Punishments, in: R. Bellamy (red.), 
Beccaria: On Crimes and Punishments and Other Writings, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2003, p. 90.  
 
22 
 
Facebook's policies that users must fill in their real name, users 
argued that Facebook has no right to decide what information is 
shared. According to complainers, users should be able to shape 
their own online identity.66F67 Around the same time, the German 
privacy watchdog concluded that Facebook, according to the 
German and European Union privacy regulations, must allow 
pseudonyms on the social network. 67F68 Facebook did not really 
changed his policy but loosened the interpretation of the rules to 
the extent that persons can be known by other persons by other 
names, 68F69 but users still have to submit proof of this identity.69F70 
A new case about this ‘real name policy’ started before the 
German courts in 2018.70F71 This longing for privacy is not 
incomprehensible now what was private is increasingly public. 71F72 
In the meantime, Facebook and Twitter are made increasingly 
responsible for safeguarding different laws on these platforms.72F73 
If authors of publications can decide by themselves what 
information they share, the possibility to moderate these 
platforms is significantly limited. One of the major issues is the 
existence of ‘fake news’. Other users are seldom rightly 
equipped to decide on what news is accurate, and what news is 
                                                 
67 E. Grinberg, ‘Facebook 'real name' policy stirs questions around identity’, 
CNN, September 18, 2014. 
68 Y. Nijs, ‘Toezichthouder: Facebook moet pseudoniemen toestaan’ 
Volkskrant, Juli 28, 2015.  
69 J. Osofsky & T. Gage, ‘Community Support FYI: Improving the Names 
Process on Facebook’, Facebook Newsroom, December 15, 2015. 
70 A list of documents to submit can be found in Facebooks’ Help Center: 
https://www.facebook.com/help/159096464162185. 
71 See for example: J. Kastrenakes, ‘German court says Facebook’s real 
name policy is illegal’, The Verge February 12, 2018. 
72 For example, labor and economics are made public at the cost of the 
private domain, see: A. Ellian, ‘De laatste titel: ten persoonlijke titel. Over 
de wet als kunstwerk en privacy (Inleiding bij een tekst uit ‘De wet als 
kunstwerk’ van Willem Witteveen)’, P&I 2017, 4, p. 168. 
73 An interesting example is the Code of conduct on countering illegal hate 
speech online from the European Commission and social media platforms 
signed in May 2016. 
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false, making these platforms (again) responsible for providing 
information towards their users. 
A constitutional balancing act 
It is unlikely that any serious academic will argue to abolish 
freedom of expression or privacy rights. Since these rights can 
clash, these different rights must be balanced. What are 
necessary restrictions to privacy rights in favour of freedom of 
expression?  
Privacy rights enable persons to spread rumours and utter 
harmful speech without facing the consequences. In other words: 
it makes the speaker irresponsible for his words. In some cases, 
privacy rights even shield speakers from legal liability.  
Private opinions voiced by an unidentifiable speaker do not add 
any value to the deliberative ideal of the democratic debate. 
Opinions are not trustworthy now they are voiced by persons 
who do not take part fully in the discussion. Do anonymous 
publications contribute to debates in society? Does freedom of 
expression imply the duty to take part in the discussion as a non-
anonymous human being?  
An example of such a debate is to be found in De Staatsregeling 
voor het Bataafsche Volk (hereafter: De Staatsregeling) 
originating from 1798.73F74 The draft of this Staatsregeling caused 
a heated discussion over anonymous publications and the 
freedom of the press. This discussion was related to an exception 
                                                 
74 ‘De Staatsregeling’ was drafted by the Constituent Assembly (Dutch: 
Constituerende Vergadering) and accepted by a referendum, see: Parlement 
& Politiek, ‘Tweede Nationale Vergadering en Constituerende Vergadering 
(1797-1798)’, parlement.com (last retrieved on July 31, 2018).  
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on this freedom. The freedoms of the press should not be used to 
offend society or any person. 74F75 
Two positions dominated the debate between parliamentarians. 
Some of them argued that this provision granted the government 
carte blanche to ‘search’ for reasons to prosecute unwelcome 
utterance. 75F76 These parliamentarians argued that this article was 
defined in such a way that the governmental powers were not 
restricted against arbitrariness, violating an important principle 
of law: the principle of legality. 76F77  
Another prominent position was that freedom of expression 
creates the possibility to voice slanderous allegations without 
facing the consequences. These parliamentarians argued that it 
should be possible for persons to defend themselves against 
defamation and slander. It is not easy to defend yourself against 
anonymous publications now the author is not publicly known. 
Consequently, anonymous publications should be forbidden 
because there are no real remedies against such defamation. 77F78  
While some parliamentarians argued that anonymous 
publications should not be taken seriously, and thus cannot be 
offending, an interesting innovation was made in the definitive 
‘Staatsregeling’. A new article 16 replaced the old article of the 
draft version. Article 16 provided a specific and exactly 
formulated provision, legally obligating writers, publishers, and 
printers to add information to identify the person(s) responsible 
                                                 
75 J. Rosendaal, Staasregeling voor het Bataafsche Volk 1798: De eerste 
grondwet van Nederland, Nijmegen: Van Tilt 2005, p. 28. 
76 J. Rosendaal, Staasregeling voor het Bataafsche Volk 1798: De eerste 
grondwet van Nederland, Nijmegen: Van Tilt 2005, p. 28. 
77 J. Rosendaal, Staasregeling voor het Bataafsche Volk 1798: De eerste 
grondwet van Nederland, Nijmegen: Van Tilt 2005, p. 28. 
78 J. Rosendaal, Staasregeling voor het Bataafsche Volk 1798: De eerste 
grondwet van Nederland, Nijmegen: Van Tilt 2005, p. 28. 
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for the publication. The new article 16 stated, translated into 
English, ‘Freedom of the Press is sacred, as the scriptures are 
provided with the name of Publisher, Printer, or Writer.’78F79 The 
provision continued: ‘These are all, at all times, liable for all 
such publications, using the Printing Press, concerning 
individual persons, or society, who are recognised as criminally 
by the Law.’79F80 
Apart from the obligation to add identifying information to the 
publication, this new provision had a much narrower scope than 
the article in the draft version. By requiring to identify the 
persons responsible for the publication it imposed an important 
restriction on both privacy rights and the freedom of the press. 
This article did not allow preventive censorship, and it limited 
the possibility of prosecuting to the instituted criminal laws. 
Thus, it was not possible to prosecute because a publication was 
sheer ‘offensive’. 80F81 
Next, to the possibility to prosecute if a publication was 
considered illegal, this provision foresaw another remedy for 
persons who were not illegally ‘grieved’ by a publication. The 
constitutional legislator argued that in the case that there were 
no prohibitions for specific publications, persons could contact 
the author to share their thoughts.81F82 This fostered an open 
environment of debate where all participants were knowable to 
each other.  
                                                 
79 In Dutch: ‘De vrijheid der Drukpers is heilig, mids de Geschriften met 
den naam van Uitgever, Drukker, of Schrijver voorzien zijn.’ 
80 In Dutch: ‘Dezen allen zijn, ten allen tijde, aansprakelijk voor alle 
zoodanige bedrijven, door middel der Drukpers, ten aanzien van 
afzonderlijke personen, of der gantsche Maatschappij, begaan, die door de 
Wet als misdadig erkend zijn.’ 
81 J. Rosendaal, Staasregeling voor het Bataafsche Volk 1798: De eerste 
grondwet van Nederland, Nijmegen: Van Tilt 2005, p. 28. 
82 J. Rosendaal, Staasregeling voor het Bataafsche Volk 1798: De eerste 
grondwet van Nederland, Nijmegen: Van Tilt 2005, p. 28. 
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In general, this system has one crucial difference with preventive 
censorship. If someone believes it is necessary to publish a 
publication, there is only a remedy afterwards. In a system were 
preventive censorship is not possible, a publication cannot be 
‘unpublished’. While this system guarantees that there is no 
judicial possibility to prevent a publication in advance, such a 
system implies that it must be possible to hold the responsible 
accountable afterwards. Such a system of ‘responsible 
publishing’ is only possible when there are remedies after the 
publication. For anonymous publications, such remedies are 
missing. Therefore, anonymous publications are considered 
dangerous. A trade-off between privacy and freedom of 
expression is made: by giving up a little bit of privacy; a greater 
right is made possible.  
The spirit of De Staatsregeling 
While the constitutional provision only lasted until 1815, the 
arguments underlying De Staatsregeling are still meaningful in 
contemporary debates on privacy and freedom of expression. 
Already in 1815, the requirement to add the name of the writer, 
publisher and the printer of the publication vanished in (a new 
constitutional) article 227, leaving only the writer, printer and 
publisher each accountable. 82F83 In 1848 this provision changed to: 
‘No one needs prior permission to reveal thoughts or feelings by 
the printing press, subjected to everyone's responsibility 
                                                 
83 The full article 227 Gw in Dutch: ‘Het is aan elk geoorloofd om zijne 
gedachten en gevoelens door de drukpers, als een doelmatig middel tot 
uitbreiding van kennis en voortgang van verlichting, te openbaren, zonder 
eenig voorafgaand verlof daartoe noodig te hebben, blijvende nogtans elk 
voor hetgeen hij schrijft, drukt, uitgeeft of verspreidt, verantwoordelijk aan 
de maatschappij of bijzondere personen, voor zoo verre dezer regten 
mogten zijn beleedigd.’ 
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according to the law.’83F84 As this provision is included in the 
contemporary article 8 in the Dutch constitution, an absolute ban 
on preventive censorship is still in place. Criminal liability can 
only be established after publication.84F85 
As said, the discussion about freedom and expression and 
privacy from De Staatsregeling is still relevant for discussions 
about the relationship between privacy and freedom of 
expression. In Dutch law, four articles reflect the discussion in 
contemporary legal cases. At first, articles 53 and 54 Sr (the 
Dutch penal code) should be named.85F86 These articles exonerate 
both the publisher (article 53 Sr) and the printer (article 54 Sr) 
of the publication from criminal contempt of press offences 86F87 
when the name and domicile of a (prosecutable) author are 
published with the publication. In contrast to the 
‘Staatsregeling’, it is not always required to publish the name of 
the author. Both the publisher and the author can prevent 
prosecution if they reveal the identity of the author when ordered 
to do so by the preliminary judge.87F88  
The second paragraph of both article 53 and 54 Sr require 
(additional) cumulative conditions, meaning that all of these 
conditions must be met to invoke the exoneration of the first 
                                                 
84 In Dutch: ‘Niemand heeft voorafgaand verlof noodig, om door de 
drukpers gedachten of gevoelens te openbaren, behoudens ieders 
verantwoordelijkheid volgens de wet.’ 
85 D.E. Bunschoten, ‘Commentaar op art. 7 Gw’, in: P. Bovend'Eert et al. 
(eds.), Tekst & Commentaar Grondwet, Deventer: Kluwer 2015. 
86 Both articles are introduced in the modern criminal law of 1881 and 
changed in 1925 (modern text)) and 2011 (minor changes) see: M. van der 
Linden, ‘Commentaar op 54 (Strafrecht)’, in: V. Mul et al. (eds.), Sdu 
Commentaar Strafrecht, Den Haag: Sdu 2017 and M.M. Dolman, 
‘Commentaar op art. 54 Sr’, in: T. Cleiren, J. Crijns & R. Verpalen (eds), 
Tekst & Commentaar Strafrecht, Deventer: Kluwer 2016. 
87 Offences which can be committed by means of the press, for example, 
criminal insult, sedition, hate speech, and defamation, and libel, see: M.M. 
Dolman, ‘Commentaar op art. 54 Sr’, in: T. Cleiren, J. Crijns & R. Verpalen 
(eds), Tekst & Commentaar Strafrecht, Deventer: Kluwer 2016. 
88 This is the judge overseeing the pre-trial investigation in criminal cases. 
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paragraph successfully. It must be able to prosecute the author. 
Both the publisher and the pressers cannot invoke this 
exoneration if they have known or should have known that the 
author was not prosecutable at the time of the publication which 
is, according to this paragraph, especially the case if the author 
has fled The Netherlands. Next to this, it always mandatory to 
publish the name (meaning the registered company name) and 
location of both the publisher and printer in the publication. The 
background of these articles is that anonymous publications, 
ordered by anonymous clients, are not possible. Printers and 
publishers cannot pass their (criminal) responsibility on elusive, 
anonymous clients.88F89 
In both article 53 and 54 Sr, the spirit of De Staatsregeling is still 
alive, requiring printers and publishers to take responsibility for 
their publications. Preventing preventive censorship, the printer 
and publisher are not responsible for the publication itself, but 
for the possibility to hold the author responsible for it. As noted 
at the beginning of this subparagraph, there are four relevant 
articles. Articles 418 and 419 Sr are complementary to articles 
53, and 53 Sr.89F90 While articles 53 and 54 Sr only exonerate from 
criminal complicity, articles 418 Sr, and 419 Sr imposes an 
independent criminal liability on both the publisher and the 
printer when they publish or press an illegal publication. It is not 
easy to prove intent on criminal complicity required for both 
article 53 and 54 Sr. Therefore articles 418 and 419 Sr contain 
an independent criminalization for the publisher and printer, 
                                                 
89 M.M. Dolman, ‘Commentaar op art. 54 Sr’, in: T. Cleiren, J. Crijns & R. 
Verpalen (eds), Tekst & Commentaar Strafrecht, Deventer: Kluwer 2016 
and M. van der Linden, ‘Commentaar op 54 (Strafrecht)’, in: V. Mul et al. 
(eds.), Sdu Commentaar Strafrecht, Den Haag: Sdu 2017. 
90 C. van Oort, ‘Commentaar op 419, 420 (Strafrecht)’, in: V. Mul et al. 
(eds.), Sdu Commentaar Strafrecht, Den Haag: Sdu 2017. 
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making the burden of proof for these articles significantly easier 
to be met.90F91 Both the printer and the publisher can exonerate 
himself the same way as when the invoke the exoneration of 
articles 53 and 53 Sr.91F92  
To conclude: responsible publishing 
Both article 53 and 54 Sr and 418 and 419 Sr deny anonymity or 
privacy for the author. Like De Staatsregeling these articles seek 
to create a climate of responsible publication. While the 
constitution makes it impossible to impose preventive 
censorship, it creates the legal possibility to hold the author, 
publisher, or printer responsible afterwards for publishing illegal 
publications.  
Such responsibility is, of course, not possible if the responsible 
parties are anonymous. Adding (or revealing) private 
information of the author makes the author entirely responsible 
for his publication. It makes the author vulnerable to criticism 
and discussion necessary in a democratic society. Readers can 
decide for themselves whether they trust the writer and his 
publication. All the required information is available.   
                                                 
91 Both articles are in place since the modern criminal law of the 
Netherlands since 1886, no significant material changes are made in their 
revisions. See: wetten.overheid.nl. 
92 The publication must be punishable for the publication itself. This is not 
the case with, for example, intellectual property violations, but with abusive 
or inflammatory documents, see: C. van Oort, ‘Commentaar op 419, 420 
(Strafrecht)’, in: V. Mul et al. (eds.), Sdu Commentaar Strafrecht, Den 
Haag: Sdu 2017 and V. Mul, ‘Uitgeven van een stuk van strafbare aard’, in: 
T. Cleiren, J. Crijns & R. Verpalen (eds.), Tekst & Commentaar Strafrecht, 
Deventer: Kluwer 2016. 
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3 The privacy turn: censorship to safeguard privacy 
In the previous paragraphs, the relationship between privacy and 
freedom of expression rights were discussed. I argued, drawing 
from Arendt, that privacy and ‘freedom of expression’ exclude 
each other. To speak, it means to speak in public. It is not 
possible for the public speaker to conceal his identity.  
One of the first possibilities to spread an opinion without 
revealing one's true identity is writing and printing books. As 
shown in De Staatsregeling, this means that anonymous writers 
can say harmful things without being responsible for these 
publications in public. The publisher and the presser of such 
books were made responsible for publications of anonymous 
authors. The only possibility they had to prevent prosecution, 
was to reveal the author's name, a provision that is still standing 
in 2018.  
In this paragraph, privacy and freedom of expression will be 
discussed in the context of the internet. First, I will explore how 
criminal liability on internet intermediaries work. Then I will 
explore how this leads to a renewed relationship with censorship. 
Both of these parts will relate to the European Union regulation 
regarding both privacy and freedom of expression.  
While reading this paragraph the following quote from the 
preface of The Human Condition must be kept in mind. 
‘Wherever the relevance of speech is at stake, matters become 
political by definition, for speech is what makes a man a political 
being.’92F93  
                                                 
93 H. Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press 1998, p. 3. 
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The privacy turn by the EU 
Under the influence of European Union regulation, a different 
direction was chosen for telecommunication. Implementing 
Directive 2000/31/EC, the Dutch legislator added 54a Sr to the 
penal code.93F94 The inclusion of this article after 53 and 54 is no 
coincidence. All these three articles have the same goal: 
preventing preventive censorship.94F95 The aim of article 54a Sr 
was: “to support the freedom of expression in a digital 
environment as much as possible by removing the tendency to 
preventive censorship.”95F96 
Article 54a Sr is different from article 53 and 54 Sr. Instead of 
revealing the identity of the author, article 54a Sr exonerates 
telecommunication intermediaries from criminal complicity 
when they remove the illegal content when instructed to do so 
by the public prosecutor. 96F97 Unlike article 53 and 54 Sr, there are 
no comparable provisions to articles 418 and 419. If the 
publisher or printer refuses to reveal the author of the publication 
they can be prosecuted for publishing illegal information.  
Intermediaries refusing to comply with the instruction from the 
public prosecutor can be prosecuted for refusing to follow an 
official order (article 184 Sr). A similar remedy as for publishers 
and printers thus is thought unnecessary for internet 
intermediaries. Intermediaries (like publishers and printers) 
might also be prosecuted for criminal complicity with the owner 
                                                 
94 Stb. 2004, 210. 
95 M.M. Dolman, ‘Commentaar op art. 54a Sr’, in: T. Cleiren, J. Crijns & R. 
Verpalen (eds.), Tekst & Commentaar Strafrecht, Deventer: Kluwer 2016. 
96 Kamerstukken II, 2001/2, 28197, 3, p. 62. 
97 The public prosecutor needs a warrant from the preliminary judge, see: 
M.M. Dolman, ‘Commentaar op art. 54 Sr’, in: T. Cleiren, J. Crijns & R. 
Verpalen (eds.), Tekst & Commentaar Strafrecht, Deventer: Kluwer 2016. 
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of the files; now they are not able to invoke the exoneration of 
54a Sr.97F98 
While the author of illegal content can engage in a dispute before 
the public courts if a publisher and printer reveal his identity, the 
owner of illegal digital content does not have a similar right nor 
duty. For digital content, the law does not require to reveal the 
identity of the publisher (or uploader) of the content. Neither the 
‘offender’ nor the offended are able in such a case to engage in 
a (public) debate to persuade one another of the righteousness of 
their opinions.98F99  
Persons who want to fight these opinions are left emptyhanded. 
Dutch law after the implementation of Directive 2000/31/EC 
holds, however, two possibilities to reveal the identity of the 
responsible author. First, it is possible in an ongoing criminal 
investigation, for the judge or the prosecution to order the 
internet intermediary to reveal data to identify the author.99F100 The 
judge and the public prosecutors are not obliged to give such an 
order, nor is every procedure a criminal procedure.  
Complainers, in other cases, are left with only civil law 
remedies. Article 6:196c BW forms the private law counterpart 
of 54a Sr, exonerating the internet intermediary from (civil) legal 
liability for the content posted by their users. As a result of the 
parliamentarian discussion, it became clear that ‘it should be 
noted that even in civil law there is a possibility that the court 
orders the service provider to disclose the source of 
                                                 
98 M.M. Dolman, ‘Commentaar op art. 54 Sr’, in: T. Cleiren, J. Crijns & R. 
Verpalen (eds.), Tekst & Commentaar Strafrecht, Deventer: Kluwer 2016. 
99 Socrates, as a true parrhesian speaker tried to convince (‘persuade’) the 
judges not only of his innocence before the law, but also of the 
meaningfulness of his opinions (H. Arendt, The promise of politics, New 
York: Schocken Books 2007, p. 6-7). 
100 Article 126na Sv. 
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information.’100F101 This disclosure can be even considered a duty: 
‘service providers may also be required to provide information 
that identifies the recipients of their service […].’101F102 In the 
judgment Lycos/Pessers 102F103 issued by the Supreme Court of the 
Netherlands 103F104 this was affirmed. The Court stated that without 
such a right ‘only a limited group of victims of anonymously 
distributed information could undertake action against such 
activities’.104F105  
Online intermediaries: a renewed balance on the platforms? 
Each of these articles has the same rationality. In modern times, 
access to public fora is granted or denied by intermediaries. If 
intermediaries fear public prosecution or civil liability for the 
opinions published by them, they will censor their authors. 
Limiting or abolishing legal responsibilities to review every 
piece of information before publishing it should improve the 
possibility for citizens to engage in public discourses.  
There seems to be a societal need to flag and remove content as 
inappropriate. Intermediaries are becoming responsible for both 
privacy and moderating for illegal and ‘harmful’ content 
although they also should guarantee the freedom of 
expression.105F106 These contradicting tasks are hard to achieve. 
Each of these rights asks a balance against another right. 
                                                 
101 Kamerstukken II, 2001/2, 28 197, 3, p. 28. 
102 Kamerstukken II, 2001/2, 28 197, 3, p. 28. 
103 Hoge Raad, November 25, 2005, ECLI:NL:HR:2005:AU4019, r.o. 5.1.1-
5.7.1. 
104 The Supreme Court is, being the highest court in the fields of civil, 
criminal and tax law in the Netherlands, is responsible for hearing appeals in 
cassation and for a number of specific tasks with which it is charged by 
law.’ Rechtspraak.nl.  
105 Hoge Raad, November 25, 2005, ECLI:NL:HR:2005:AU4019, r.o. 5.7.1. 
106 This is expressed, for example, in the Code of Conduct on Countering 
Illegal Hate Speech Online between the European Commission and various 
internet platforms.  
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Different from De Staatsregeling there is not chosen for the duty 
to publish (or reveal) the name of the author. Instead, these 
internet platforms are made responsible for removing illegal 
content. Abolishing the right of privacy to maintain an open 
sphere of discussion between humans seemed not one of the 
possibilities.  
Some older publications do mention anonymity as an 
influencing factor on online misbehaviour, while in newer report 
privacy as a negative impact on freedom of expression is not 
even discussed. In the UNESCO-publication ‘Countering Online 
Hate Speech’, the authors argue that anonymity on the internet 
is difficult to achieve because it takes advanced technological 
percussions,106F107 Most users who publish under a pseudonym, are 
known by a few other persons.107F108 
In a recent report about ‘disinformation’, the Instituut voor 
Informatierecht (IViR) does not mention privacy or anonymity 
as a relevant policy posibility for preventing disinformation. It 
only writes that ‘Closing automated accounts could also make a 
useful contribution to the reduction of disinformation online. 
The techniques for identifying such accounts should not lead to 
general surveillance practices or other practices that harm the 
rights to freedom of expression, privacy, data protection or other 
users rights unnecessarily.'108F109  
Closing accounts and removing content are seen as a lesser evil 
than requiring users to submit their real identity. In this context, 
I recall the controversy over Facebook's real name policy 
                                                 
107 I. Gagliardone, Countering Online Hate Speech, Paris: UNESCO 2015, 
p. 15. 
108 I. Gagliardone, Countering Online Hate Speech, Paris: UNESCO 2015, 
p. 14 and 54. 
109 T. McGonagle et al., Inventarisatie methodes om “nepnieuws” tegen te 
gaan, 2018, p. 61-62. 
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discussed in the second paragraph of this contribution. A duty to 
reveal the true identity of the account holder would abolish this 
problem of ‘fake account’ altogether.  
The European Commission does not mention privacy 
restrictions as a possible solution and argues on their website 
also: ‘that decisions to remove content are accurate and well-
founded, especially when automated tools are used, companies 
should put in place effective and appropriate safeguards, 
including human oversight and verification, in full respect of 
fundamental rights, freedom of expression and data protection 
rules.’109F110 Remarkably, even the ‘Final report of the High Level 
Expert Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation’ does 
not mention privacy or anonymity anywhere as a problem related 
to disinformation.110F111 
A modern issue is an interwovenness between the public and the 
private realms. To some extent, Facebook offers a private online 
space for communication with friends and family. At the same 
time, it is a public platform where the possible reach of a 
message is unforeseeable.111F112 It is this ‘blend’ of private and 
public speech which makes it hard to regulate anonymous speech 
on the internet. The idea that every kind of online speech can be 
‘private’ cannot hold. 
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Not every measure abolishing anonymity is criticised. In the 
guise of transparency, Facebook112F113 and Twitter113F114 announced to 
regulate political advertisements. For example, Facebook 
requires users to authorise before they can publish political 
advertisements and managing pages with substantial amounts of 
followers. After this policy change, only authorised advertisers 
can run advertisements for elections and other political topics on 
both Facebook and Instagram. Users who want to run such 
advertisements need to verify their identity and location.114F115 
Twitter's policy is like Facebook’s policy. During Federal 
elections in the United States of America, political advertisers 
need to self-identify and certify that they are located in the U.S. 
Twitters new policy disallows foreign citizens, organisations or 
businesses to issue political advertisements targeting users in the 
United States of America.115F116 Certification by Twitter requires 
(depending on the entity who applies) various supporting 
documents.116F117  
Both Facebook and Twitter, as set out above, argue that this is a 
necessary intervention to give information about the origin of the 
advertisements. By abolishing a bit of privacy, a greater right is 
gained. 
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Conclusion: privacy and freedom of expression 
In the first paragraph, I have argued that privacy and public 
speech are mutual exclusives. In that paragraph, my argument 
was mainly about the character of speech. It is impossible to 
speak in public as a person, without revealing your true identity. 
With Arendt, I argued that in publicity it is possible for humans 
to engage in relationships with other humans. The public realm 
expresses the plurality and equality of humanity. Public speech 
is speaking with one’s full humanity. It is honest speech now the 
speaker does not conceal himself. It is responsible speech 
because the speaker knows that he endangers himself and his 
relationship with others. Only such exercise of freedom of 
expression captures the full meaning of this right. It expresses 
the political necessity to share ethical opinions with other 
humans to question existing agreements.  
The first argument of this paper focused on the character of the 
freedom of expression. Expression, as I view it, is a human 
activity to be fulfilled in public with other humans. Freedom of 
expression in private is not the exercise of such a right at all. The 
second argument was more ‘utilitarian’. This argument focused 
on the possibility to safeguard these rights as a political 
organization.  
According to De Staatsregeling, a publication was not possible 
without revealing the responsible author of the publications. 
Publications had to be printed with the name of the author, 
publisher and printer. In contemporary Dutch law, this is no 
longer the case. It is only required to reveal the author of the 
publication when the preliminary judge orders this. 
De Staatsregeling did not only provided a possibility of 
prosecuting the responsible author, but it also expressed the right 
to engage in discussion with the author as a citizen. How do we 
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know someone is genuine if he expresses his opinion 
anonymously (mind the internet troll)? How do we know if he is 
a member of the same political community (mind disinformation 
from abroad)? How do we even know that he is a real person, 
made of flesh and blood? For both the online and the offline 
world applies that there is no such thing as implied trust. Trust 
is gained by sharing information. Online privacy rights, as 
informational privacy, fosters distrust. It creates the possibility 
to publish an opinion while arguing that it is a private opinion.  
It is not possible to know who is expressing this opinion. It is 
thus not possible to know if someone is truthful and consistent. 
When such a publication is published, it is just an opinion 
standing on his own. On the internet, anonymous publishing is 
even more problematic. Not only the identity of a person counts 
but also the place from where he publishes.  
It is peculiar that within the European Union regulation the 
choice is made to impose a duty on internet intermediaries to 
remove content. Sometimes such content is even removed by 
(automated) preventive censorship. Now it is no longer required 
to reveal the anonymous author; it is not possible to engage in 
discussion with the author.  
These policy changes led to a renewed relationship with 
censorship. Now it is not possible to argue with the author; we 
point our arrows at the intermediaries. Intermediaries, under 
societal and political pressure, are made increasingly responsible 
for policing their platforms. At the same time, anonymous 
publishers are no longer responsible for what they voice; not 
against society nor persons.  
